![[Review] The New Lombard Street: How the Fed Became the Dealer of Last Resort (Perry Mehrling) Summarized](https://episodes.castos.com/660078c6833215-59505987/images/2397907/c1a-085k3-jpq52861hon5-2xsquv.jpg)
Show Notes
The New Lombard Street: How the Fed Became the Dealer of Last Resort (Perry Mehrling)
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- Read more: https://english.9natree.com/read/B004QOB45Q/
#dealeroflastresort #moneyview #repomarkets #marketliquidity #FederalReservecrisisintervention #TheNewLombardStreet
The New Lombard Street by Perry Mehrling is a compact work of monetary and financial history that explains how the United States Federal Reserve evolved from a traditional central bank into an institution that must sometimes support market liquidity directly. Using Walter Bagehot’s nineteenth century principles as a starting point, Mehrling argues that modern finance is organized around dealer based securities markets and short term funding, not only deposit taking banks. In that environment, crises often appear as runs in wholesale money markets, where the problem is not just solvency but the disappearance of market making and the sudden inability to trade at reasonable prices. The book’s purpose is to provide a framework for understanding what the Fed actually does in stress events, especially around the 2008 financial crisis, and why those actions do not fit neatly into standard textbook accounts. Mehrling advances the money view, an approach that emphasizes financial plumbing, payments, collateral, and the structure of money markets as central to central banking.
This book fits readers who want a structurally grounded explanation of what central banks do in modern crises, especially people in finance, economics, policy, or market regulation who are comfortable with institutional detail. It is also valuable for informed general readers who found standard narratives of the 2008 crisis unsatisfying because they focused on broad macro indicators while neglecting the machinery of money markets and collateral. The intellectual benefit is a framework that links balance sheets, market making, and liquidity to central bank action, making emergency programs and balance sheet expansion more comprehensible as responses to specific breakdowns in market functioning. Practically, the book encourages readers to watch the health of funding markets, repo conditions, and dealer intermediation when assessing systemic risk, rather than relying only on bank capital ratios or policy rates. Compared with many crisis books that emphasize personalities, politics, or housing finance alone, Mehrling stands out by treating the crisis as a problem of market liquidity and monetary structure, and by updating Bagehot’s logic for a system dominated by securities markets. Its concise style leaves some topics less explored than longer histories, but it delivers a distinctive, coherent lens that helps interpret both past interventions and the continuing evolution of central banking.
- Amazon USA Store: https://www.amazon.com/dp/B004QOB45Q?tag=9natree-20
- Amazon Worldwide Store: https://global.buys.trade/The-New-Lombard-Street%3A-How-the-Fed-Became-the-Dealer-of-Last-Resort-Perry-Mehrling.html
- eBay: https://www.ebay.com/sch/i.html?_nkw=The+New+Lombard+Street+How+the+Fed+Became+the+Dealer+of+Last+Resort+Perry+Mehrling+&mkcid=1&mkrid=711-53200-19255-0&siteid=0&campid=5339060787&customid=9natree&toolid=10001&mkevt=1
- Read more: https://english.9natree.com/read/B004QOB45Q/
#dealeroflastresort #moneyview #repomarkets #marketliquidity #FederalReservecrisisintervention #TheNewLombardStreet
The New Lombard Street by Perry Mehrling is a compact work of monetary and financial history that explains how the United States Federal Reserve evolved from a traditional central bank into an institution that must sometimes support market liquidity directly. Using Walter Bagehot’s nineteenth century principles as a starting point, Mehrling argues that modern finance is organized around dealer based securities markets and short term funding, not only deposit taking banks. In that environment, crises often appear as runs in wholesale money markets, where the problem is not just solvency but the disappearance of market making and the sudden inability to trade at reasonable prices. The book’s purpose is to provide a framework for understanding what the Fed actually does in stress events, especially around the 2008 financial crisis, and why those actions do not fit neatly into standard textbook accounts. Mehrling advances the money view, an approach that emphasizes financial plumbing, payments, collateral, and the structure of money markets as central to central banking.
This book fits readers who want a structurally grounded explanation of what central banks do in modern crises, especially people in finance, economics, policy, or market regulation who are comfortable with institutional detail. It is also valuable for informed general readers who found standard narratives of the 2008 crisis unsatisfying because they focused on broad macro indicators while neglecting the machinery of money markets and collateral. The intellectual benefit is a framework that links balance sheets, market making, and liquidity to central bank action, making emergency programs and balance sheet expansion more comprehensible as responses to specific breakdowns in market functioning. Practically, the book encourages readers to watch the health of funding markets, repo conditions, and dealer intermediation when assessing systemic risk, rather than relying only on bank capital ratios or policy rates. Compared with many crisis books that emphasize personalities, politics, or housing finance alone, Mehrling stands out by treating the crisis as a problem of market liquidity and monetary structure, and by updating Bagehot’s logic for a system dominated by securities markets. Its concise style leaves some topics less explored than longer histories, but it delivers a distinctive, coherent lens that helps interpret both past interventions and the continuing evolution of central banking.
